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Abstract
In the framework of the solution theory for cooperative transferable utility games, Hami-
ache axiomatized the well-known Shapley value as the unique one-point solution verifying
the inessential game property, continuity, and associated consistency. The purpose of this
paper is to extend Hamiache’s axiomatization to the class of efficient, symmetric, and
linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important representative. For this
enlarged class of values, explicit relationships to the Shapley value are exploited in order
to axiomatize such values with reference to a slightly adapted inessential game property,
continuity, and a similar associated consistency. The latter axiom requires that the solu-
tions of the initial game and its associated game (with the same player set, but a different
characteristic function) coincide.
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1 Introduction and notions
Formally, a transferable utility game (or cooperative game or coalitional game with side pay-
ments) is a pair 〈N, v〉, where N is a finite set of at least two players and v : 2N → R is
a characteristic function satisfying v(∅) = 0. An element of N (notation: i ∈ N) and a
nonempty subset S of N (notation: S ⊆ N or S ∈ 2N with S 6= ∅) is called a player and
coalition respectively, and the real number v(S) is called the worth of coalition S. The size
(cardinality) of coalition S is denoted by |S| or, if no ambiguity is possible, by s. Particularly,
n denotes the size of the player set N . Let G denote the universal game space consisting of
all TU-games. A TU-game 〈N, v〉 is called superadditive if v(S ∪ T ) ≥ v(S) + v(T ) for all
S, T ⊆ N with S ∩ T = ∅.
The solution part of cooperative game theory deals with the allocation problem of how to di-
vide, for any TU-game 〈N, v〉. the overall earnings the amount of v(N) among the players. In
conformity with the traditional one-point solution part, with every TU-game is associated a
single allocation called the value of the TU-game. Formally, a value on G is a function Φ that
assigns a single payoff vector Φ(N, v) = (Φi(N, v))i∈N ∈ RN to every TU-game 〈N, v〉 ∈ G.
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The so-called value Φi(N, v) of player i in the game 〈N, v〉 represents an assessment by i of
his gains for participating in the game. Without going into details, we recall the well-known
Shapley value Sh(N, v) = (Shi(N, v))i∈N ∈ RN as follows ([6], [4], [1]): for all i ∈ N
Shi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
1
n · (n−1s ) ·
[
v(S ∪ {i})− v(S)
]
. (1.1)
The eldest axiomatization of the Shapley value is stated in 1953 by Shapley himself [6] by
referring to four properties called efficiency, symmetry, linearity, and dummy player property.
The most recent axiomatization of the Shapley value is stated in 2001 by Hamiache [2] who
proposed a new set of axioms called the inessential game property, continuity, and associated
consistency. The purpose of this paper is to extend Hamiache’s axiomatization to the class
of efficient, symmetric, and linear values, of which the Shapley value is the most important
representative. For this enlarged class of values, explicit relationships to the Shapley value will
be exploited in order to axiomatize such values by referring to a slightly adapted inessential
game property, continuity, and a similar associated consistency. Concerning values for TU-
games, firstly let us review several properties treated in former axiomatizations of the Shapley
value and secondly, we recall four equivalent interpretations of the class of efficient, symmetric,
and linear values.
Definition 1.1. A value Φ on the universal game space G possesses
(i) efficiency, if
∑
i∈N
Φi(N, v) = v(N) for all games 〈N, v〉;
(ii) symmetry, if Φpi(i)(N,piv) = Φi(N, v) for all games 〈N, v〉, all i ∈ N , and every permu-
tation pi on N . Here the game 〈N,piv〉 is defined by (piv)(piS) := v(S) for all S ⊆ N ;
(iii) linearity, if Φ(N,α · v + β · w) = α · Φ(N, v) + β · Φ(N,w) for all games 〈N, v〉, 〈N,w〉,
and all α ∈ R, β ∈ R. Here the game 〈N,α · v+ β ·w〉 is defined by (α · v+ β ·w)(S) :=
α · v(S) + β · w(S) for all S ⊆ N ;
(iv) inessential game property, if Φi(N, v) = v({i}) for all inessential games 〈N, v〉, and all
i ∈ N . Here the game 〈N, v〉 is inessential if v(S) =∑j∈S v({j}) for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅;
(v) continuity, if for any (pointwise) convergent sequence of games {〈N, vm〉}∞m=0, say the
limit of which is the game 〈N, v˜〉, the corresponding sequence of values {Φ(N, vm)}∞m=0
converges to the value Φ(N, v˜).
Throughout this paper we deal with two adaptations of games. The first adaptation of a given
game 〈N, v〉 concerns the following optimistic self-evaluation by coalitions. Every coalition S
evaluates its own worth vShλ (S) in the associated game 〈N, vShλ 〉 as the sum of its initial worth
v(S) and a percentage λ ∈ [0, 1] of all possible surpluses v(S ∪ {j}) − v(S) − v({j}) arising
from mutual cooperation (instead of non-cooperation) among the coalition S itself and any
of each non-members j ∈ N\S. 1 For superadditive games 〈N, v〉, we have vShλ (S) ≥ v(S) for
1To be coherent with Hamiache’s ([2], pages 281-282) myopic vision of the environment, every coalition S
ignores the links existing between players in N\S. As a consequence, a coalition S considers itself at the center
of a star-like graph, which is equivalent to say that coalition S considers players in N\S as isolated elements.
Following the additional “divide and rule” behavior of the coalitions, S may believe that the appropriation of
at least a part of the surpluses v(S ∪ {j})− v(S)− v({j}), generated by its cooperation with each one of the
isolated players j ∈ N\S, is within reach.
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all S ⊆ N , while vShλ (S) = v(S) for inessential games 〈N, v〉. Further, the worth of the grand
coalition N does not change under this adaptation, i.e., vShλ (N) = v(N).
The associated consistency requires that the value is invariant under the adaptation of the
game into its associated game. Because payoffs to players neither increase nor decrease, there
are not adverse effects of such optimistic self-evaluations by coalitions.
Definition 1.2. (cf. Hamiache [2])
(i) Given any game 〈N, v〉 and λ ∈ [0, 1], define its (standard) associated game 〈N, vShλ 〉 by
vShλ (S) := v(S) + λ ·
∑
j∈N\S
[
v(S ∪ {j})− v(S)− v({j})
]
for all S ⊆ N. (1.2)
(ii) A value Φ on G possesses associated consistency with respect to the associated game of
(1.2) if Φ(N, vShλ ) = Φ(N, v) for all games 〈N, v〉, and all λ ∈ [0, 1].
The second adaptation of a game concerns a check of credibility of the characteristic function
by an independent arbiter. The task of the arbiter is to perform a scaling procedure by
taking into account the sizes of both the player set and the coalition (but not the coalition
itself). That is, for every coalition S ⊆ N , its initial worth v(S) will be scaled down or up
to bns · v(S) by some non-negative scaling number bns ≥ 0, where s denotes the cardinality of
coalition S. For example, if bns =
1
s , then the scaling procedure involves averaging the worth
of any coalition, different from the grand coalition N . By convention, bnn = 1 for the sake of
efficiency invariance expressed by the invariant worth of the grand coalition. Throughout the
remainder of the paper, let N = {0, 1, 2, 3, . . .} denote the set of all natural numbers and let
B = {bns | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n} denote a collection of non-negative scaling constants
with bnn = 1 for all n ≥ 2. No scaling at all is expressed by the collection U of unit constants
(equal to one).
Definition 1.3. Given a collection B of non-negative scaling constants and any game 〈N, v〉
with at least two players, define its B-scaled game 〈N,Bv〉 as follows: (Bv)(∅) := 0 and
(Bv)(S) := bns · v(S) for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅.
In view of the explicit formula (1.1), it follows immediately that the Shapley value possesses
the inessential game property and continuity as well, whereas some non-trivial calculations
are necessary to verify the associated consistency of the Shapley value with respect to the
associated game of (1.2), that is Sh(N, vShλ ) = Sh(N, v) for all games 〈N, v〉, and all λ ∈ [0, 1].
In fact, the main theorem in Hamiache ([2], page 282) states that the Shapley value is the
unique value verifying the inessential game property, continuity, and associated consistency
with respect to the associated game of (1.2) (provided 0 < λ < 2n). The uniqueness proof is
rather tough and full of combinatorial calculations.
In the remainder we aim to develop a similar axiomatization for any efficient, symmetric, and
linear value. The explicit relationship between the Shapley value and any efficient, symmetric,
and linear value is listed in the following fundamental theorem. One out of four equivalent
statements refers to the adaptation of the game into its B-scaled game.
Theorem 1.4. (Equivalence Theorem).
The next four statements for a value ψ on the universal game space G are equivalent.
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(i) ψ possesses efficiency, symmetry, and linearity.
(ii) There exists a (unique) collection of constants {ρns | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1}
such that, for every n-person game 〈N, v〉 with at least two players, the value payoff
vector (ψi(N, v))i∈N ∈ RN is of the following form ([5], Lemma 9, page 117): for all
i ∈ N
ψi(N, v) =
v(N)
n
+
∑
S$N,
S3i
ρns
s
· v(S)−
∑
S⊆N,
S 63i
ρns
n− s · v(S). (1.3)
(iii) There exists a (unique) collection of constants B = {bns | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n}
with bnn := 1 such that, for every n-person game 〈N, v〉 with at least two players, the
value payoff vector (ψi(N, v))i∈N ∈ RN is of the following form: for all i ∈ N
ψi(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N\{i}
1
n · (n−1s ) ·
[
bns+1 · v(S ∪ {i})− bns · v(S)
]
. (1.4)
(iv) There exists a (unique) collection of constants B = {bns | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n}
with bnn := 1 such that ψ(N, v) = Sh(N,Bv) for every game 〈N, v〉 with at least two
players, i.e.,
ψi(N, v) = Shi(N,Bv) for all i ∈ N . (1.5)
It is left to the reader to verify, by straightforward computations, that the expression at the
right hand of (1.3) agrees with the one at the right hand of (1.4) by choosing bns =
(
n
s
) · ρns for
all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1}. Whenever bns = 1 for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n}, the expression at the right
hand of (1.4) reduces to the Shapley value payoff (1.1) of player i in the n-person game 〈N, v〉
itself, that is ψ = Sh. Generally speaking, in view of (1.1), the right hand of (1.4) equals the
Shapley value payoff Shi(N,Bv) of player i in the B-scaled game 〈N,Bv〉. In summary, the
Equivalence Theorem 1.4 states that a value ψ is efficient, symmetric, and linear if and only
if the ψ-value of a game coincides with the Shapley value of the B-scaled game. Throughout
the development of the new theory and the forthcoming proofs we prefer to make use of the
equality ψ(N, v) = Sh(N,Bv) among value payoff vectors.
Example 1.5. Taken into account the separable contribution SCi(N, v) := v(N)− v(N\{i})
of any player i ∈ N in the game 〈N, v〉, the egalitarian distribution of the remaining non-
separable contribution NSC(N, v) := v(N) − ∑
j∈N
SCj(N, v) yields the so-called egalitarian
non-separable contribution ENSC-value. That is, for all games 〈N, v〉,
ENSCi(N, v) = SCi(N, v) +
NSC(N, v)
n
for all i ∈ N .
It is easy to verify that the ENSC-value is an efficient, symmetric, and linear value and in
fact, its corresponding collection B = {bns } of scaling constants is given by bnn = 1, bnn−1 = n−1,
and bns = 0 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 2. By Equivalence Theorem 1.4, ENSC(N, v) = Sh(N,Bv)
for all games 〈N, v〉.
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Definition 1.6. Let B = {bns } be a collection of non-negative scaling constants with bnn = 1
for all n ≥ 2.
(i) A game 〈N, v〉 is called B-inessential if its B-scaled game 〈N,Bv〉 is inessential, i.e.,
(Bv)(S) = ∑
j∈S
(Bv)({j}) for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, or equivalently, bns ·v(S) =
∑
j∈S
bn1 ·v({j}).
(ii) A value Φ on G possesses B-inessential game property if Φi(N, v) = bn1 · v({i}) for all
B-inessential games 〈N, v〉, and all i ∈ N .
Alternatively, with respect to a given collection of positive constants B, a game 〈N, v〉 is B-
inessential if and only if there exists a vector ~x = (xk)k∈N ∈ RN such that v(S) = b
n
1
bns
·∑j∈S xj
for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅. In words, a game is B-inessential if it is decomposable as a product of
an inessential game (associated with some vector ~x ∈ RN ) and a specific B-symmetric game.
For example, the game 〈N, v〉 with characteristic function v(S) = |S|2 for all S $ N , and
v(N) = |N |, is B-inessential with respect to the averaging collection of constants bns = 1s .
Generally speaking, for arbitrary positive numbers α and p, the game 〈N, v〉 with character-
istic function v(S) = α · |S|p for all S $ N , and v(N) = α · |N |, is B-inessential with respect
to the collection of constants bns = s
1−p.
We conclude this section with the claim that any efficient, symmetric, and linear value ψ on G
satisfies the B-inessential game property, provided the collection of non-negative constants B
corresponds to ψ through (1.5). Indeed, by applying the equivalence (1.5) and the well-known
inessential game property for the Shapley value, applied to the B-scaled game, respectively, it
follows that ψi(N, v) = Shi(N,Bv) = (Bv)({i}) = bn1 ·v({i}) for all B-inessential games 〈N, v〉,
and all i ∈ N . For example, the ENSC-value satisfies the B-inessential game property, where
the scaling constants are zero, except for bnn = 1, b
n
n−1 = n− 1.
2 Extended associated consistency
Recall that an independent arbiter is supposed to scale down or up any game through a
collection of non-negative scaling constants B. Incorporating this scaling procedure, the B-
associated game is meant to represent the optimistic self-evaluation by coalitions, mathemat-
ically expressed as the associated game of the scaled version of the initial game. Throughout
this section let B = {bns } be a collection of positive scaling constants with bnn = 1 for all n ≥ 2.
Definition 2.1. Let U denote the collection of unit constants (equal to one).
(i) Given any game 〈N, v〉 and λ ∈ [0, 1], define its B-associated game 〈N, vBλ 〉 as follows:
vBλ (∅) := 0 and for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
(B(vBλ ))(S) := (Bv)(S) + λ ·
∑
j∈N\S
[
(Bv)(S ∪ {j})− (Bv)(S)− (Bv)({j})
]
i.e.,
bns · vBλ (S) := bns · v(S) + λ ·
∑
j∈N\S
[
bns+1 · v(S ∪ {j})− bns · v(S)− bn1 · v({j})
]
. (2.1)
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(ii) Particularly, for all games 〈N,w〉, all λ ∈ [0, 1], and all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
wUλ (S) := w(S) + λ ·
∑
j∈N\S
[
w(S ∪ {j})− w(S)− w({j})
]
.
(iii) A value Φ on G possesses B-associated consistency with respect to the B-associated
game of (2.1) if Φ(N, vBλ ) = Φ(N, v) for all games 〈N, v〉, and all λ ∈ [0, 1].
Firstly, note that the U-associated game agrees with the standard associated game, i.e.,
〈N, vUλ 〉 = 〈N, vShλ 〉. Secondly, notice that the B-scaled version of the B-associated game
〈N, vBλ 〉 agrees with the U-associated game of the B-scaled version of the initial game 〈N, v〉.
In formula, for all games 〈N, v〉, and all λ ∈ [0, 1],
〈N,B(vBλ )〉 = 〈N, (Bv)Uλ 〉 (2.2)
Alternatively, it turns out that the B-scaling operator and the two associated game operators
with reference to the two collections of scaling constants B and U generate a commutative
diagram. The scaling procedure requires a collection of positive scaling constants B since zero
constants may cause problems for the B-associated game to be well-defined. For example, in
the setting of the ENSC-value, its corresponding collection of scaling constants B = {bns } is
given by bnn = 1, b
n
n−1 = n − 1, and bns = 0 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 2. Consequently, (2.1) is not
solvable for vBλ (S) with |S| = n− 2 due to bnn−2 = 0, bn1 = 0, whereas bnn−1 6= 0.
Remark 2.2. We provide an algebraic interpretation of the B-associated game 〈N, vBλ 〉 of
(2.1) through a matrix analysis. Fix the player set N of size n, write m = 2n − 1, and let
λ ∈ [0, 1]. According to the matrix approach, any game 〈N, v〉 is identified with its column
vector ~v = (v(S))S∈2N\{∅} ∈ Rm of the worth of all coalitions ordered in the traditional
manner (e.g., the singletons at the top). In this vector-matrix setting, the description (2.1)
of the characteristic function vUλ of the standard associated game may be interpreted as the
matrix-vector equation ~vUλ =Mλ · ~v for a certain (m×m)-matrix Mλ = [Mλ]S,T∈2N\{∅}.
Further, associate with the collection (bnj )
n
j=1 of positive constants the (m×m)-diagonalmatrix
B = [B]S,T∈2N\{∅} given by [B]S,S = bn|S| for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, where bnn = 1. Then the matrix-
vector equation B · ~vBλ =Mλ · (B · ~v) corresponds to formula (2.1) for the B-associated game
〈N, vBλ 〉. To conclude with, the “similarity” representation ~vBλ = (B−1 ·Mλ · B) · ~v for the
B-associated game is rather common in matrix theory and provides another motivation to
study these concepts. The matrix analysis of the B-associated game, however, is beyond the
scope of this paper, but is a main topic for further research on B-associated consistency.
Proposition 2.3. Let ψ be the efficient, symmetric, and linear value on G, corresponding to
a collection of positive scaling constants B. Then
(i) ψ satisfies B-associated consistency, i.e., ψ(N, vBλ ) = ψ(N, v) for all games 〈N, v〉, and
all λ ∈ [0, 1].
(ii) ψ satisfies the B-inessential game property.
(iii) ψ satisfies continuity.
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PROOF.
(i) By applying the Equivalence Theorem to the value ψ twice, the game equality (2.2), and
the U-associated consistency for the Shapley value ([2], page 282) applied to the B-scaled
game, respectively, it follows for all games 〈N, v〉 ∈ G, and all λ ∈ [0, 1],
ψ(N, vBλ )
(1.5)
= Sh(N,B(vBλ ))
(2.2)
= Sh(N, (Bv)Uλ ) = Sh(N,Bv)
(1.5)
= ψ(N, v).
This proves B-associated consistency for ψ, whereas the B-inessential game property for ψ
was already proven at the end of the previous section.
(iii) Finally, continuity for ψ holds because the Shapley value satisfies continuity. Given
any (pointwise) convergent sequence of games {〈N, vk〉}∞k=0, say the limit of which is the
game 〈N, v˜〉, the sequence of B-scaled games {〈N,B(vk)〉}∞k=0 converges too, the limit of
which is the B-scaled game 〈N,Bv˜〉. Consequently, the corresponding sequence of Shapley
values {Sh(N,B(vk))}∞k=0 converges to the Shapley value Sh(N,Bv˜), or equivalently, the
corresponding sequence of values {ψ(N, vk)}∞k=0 converges to the value ψ(N, v˜). 2
Now we are able to state our main result concerning an axiomatic characterization of any
efficient, symmetric, and linear value. The remaining uniqueness part of its proof will be
treated in the next section.
Theorem 2.4. Let B be a collection of positive scaling constants. There exists a unique value
Φ on G verifying the B-inessential game property, continuity, and B-associated consistency
with respect to the B-associated game of (2.1) (provided 0 < λ < 2n). The value Φ is
the efficient, symmetric, and linear value ψ on G induced by B (see (1.4) or equivalently,
ψ(N, v) = Sh(N,Bv) for all games 〈N, v〉).
3 Proof of uniqueness part of Theorem 2.4.
Throughout this section let B = {bns } be a collection of positive scaling constants with bnn = 1
for all n ≥ 2. In comparison to Hamiache’s proof of uniqueness in the setting of the Shapley
value, our current approach is similar by applying the adapted B-associated game procedure
repeatedly. That is, the notion of m-repeated B-associated game 〈N, vm∗Bλ 〉 will be introduced
in such a way that v1∗Bλ = v
B
λ and v
2∗B
λ = (v
B
λ )
B
λ and v
3∗B
λ = (v
2∗B
λ )
B
λ and so on.
Definition 3.1. Let B be a collection of positive scaling constants, 〈N, v〉 ∈ G, and λ ∈ [0, 1].
Recall Definition 2.1 of the B-associated game 〈N, vBλ 〉 of (2.1).
(i) For all m ∈ N, let the m-repeated B-associated game 〈N, vm∗Bλ 〉 be defined recursively
by vm∗Bλ := (v
(m−1)∗B
λ )
B
λ
, where v0∗Bλ := v. For simplicity of notation, from now on we
omit the symbols with reference to λ.
(ii) For all m ∈ N, denote the game representation of the m-repeated B-associated game
〈N, vm∗B〉 as a linear combination of the worth v(T ) for all coalitions T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, by
vm∗B(S) =
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
γSm,B(T ) · v(T ) for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅. (3.1)
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We distinguish two tasks. The first task concerns the study of these game representations
(3.1) in order to present an interrelationship between two game representations switching
from an arbitrary collection of constants B to the standard collection of unit constants U .
The forthcoming interrelationship (3.2) is rather appealing since it takes into account only
the quotient of two constants from the collection B. As an adjunct, we derive the extended
version of (2.2) in that the B-scaled game of the m-repeated B-associated game equals the
m-repeated standard associated game of the B-scaled game, that is B(vm∗B) = (Bv)m∗U .
The two proofs are independent from Hamiache’s work in the setting of the Shapley value.
The second task concerns the study of convergence of any sequence {γSm,B(T )}∞m=1, for fixed
coalitions S, T . Due to the completion of the first task, the former sequence converges
if and only if the standard sequence {γSm,U (T )}∞m=1 converges, which convergence problems
has been completely solved in Hamiache’s work [2]. Nevertheless, since the outcomes of these
convergent sequences are slightly different, it is necessary to present the last stage of a slightly
adapted proof of uniqueness.
Subsection 3.1. Interrelationships between game representations.
Proposition 3.2. Concerning the n-person game representations (3.1) it holds that for all
m ∈ N, all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, for all T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅,
γSm,B(T ) =
bnt
bns
· γSm,U (T ). (3.2)
Consequently, 〈N,B(vm∗B)〉 = 〈N, (Bv)m∗U 〉, i.e., (B(vm∗B))(S) = (Bv)m∗U (S) for all S ⊆ N .
PROOF. Let 〈N, v〉 ∈ G. The proof of (3.2) is rather technical (proceeding by induc-
tion on m ≥ 1) and will be postponed till the appendix. However, (3.2) as well as the
game representation (3.1) are helpful to establish the proof of the latter game equality
〈N,B(vm∗B)〉 = 〈N, (Bv)m∗U 〉. For all m ∈ N, all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
(B(vm∗B))(S) = bns · (vm∗B(S))
(3.1)
=
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
γSm,B(T ) · bns · v(T )
(3.2)
=
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
γSm,U (T ) · bnt · v(T ) =
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
γSm,U (T ) · (Bv)(T )
(3.1)
= (Bv)m∗U (S)
2
Subsection 3.2. Convergence results.
Hamiache’s results 5 and 6 ([2], page 285) state that, for all coalitions S and T , the stan-
dard sequence {γSm,U (T )}∞m=1 converges provided 0 < λ < 2n (the proof of result 6 is rather
complex). Hence, by (3.2), for all coalitions S, T , and all collections of positive constants B,
the induced sequence {γSm,B(T )}∞m=1 converges too, the limit of which is denoted by γ˜SB(T ).
Define the limit game 〈N, v˜B〉 by
v˜B(S) =
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
γ˜SB(T ) · v(T ) for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅. (3.3)
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By (3.1), the sequence of repeated B-associated games {〈N, vm∗B〉}∞m=1 converges (pointwise)
to the limit game 〈N, v˜B〉. For any value Φ satisfying continuity, the corresponding sequence
of values {Φ(N, vm∗B)}∞m=1 converges to the value Φ(N, v˜B). If, in addition, the value Φ
satisfies B-associated consistency, then Φ(N, vm∗B) = Φ(N, v) for all m ∈ N. Hence, by
convergence, Φ(N, v˜B) = Φ(N, v). In the setting of the standard collection with unit constants
U , Hamiache’s result 8 ([2], page 288) states that the limit game 〈N, v˜U 〉 is an inessential game.
In our current framework with reference to an arbitrary collection of positive constants B,
we claim that the limit game 〈N, v˜B〉 is B-inessential, that is the B-scaled game 〈N,B(v˜B)〉 is
inessential. The proof of the fundamental claim will be based on the following convergence
results taken from Hamiache’s former work.
Theorem 3.3. ([2], results 7, 6, 5, pages 287, 285, 285 respectively).
Let 0 < λ < 2n , and S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, and T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅. Then
(i) γ˜SU (T ) =
∑
j∈S
γ˜
{j}
U (T ) (3.4)
(ii) γ˜SU (T ) =
1
n− t ·
∑
j∈T
γ˜SU (T\{j}) provided 2 ≤ t < n. (3.5)
(iii) γ˜SU ({j}) =
{ n−s
n·(n−1) , if j ∈ S,
−s
n·(n−1) , if j 6∈ S.
(3.6)
Corollary 3.4. Let 0 < λ < 2n , and S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, and T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅. Then
(i) γ˜SB(T ) =
bnt
bns
· γ˜SU (T ) (3.7)
(ii) γ˜SB(T ) =
bn1
bns
·
∑
j∈S
γ˜
{j}
B (T ) (3.8)
(iii) γ˜SB(T ) =
1
n− t ·
bnt
bnt−1
·
∑
j∈T
γ˜SB(T\{j}) provided 2 ≤ t < n. (3.9)
(iv) γ˜SB({j}) =

bn1
bns
· n−sn·(n−1) , if j ∈ S,
bn1
bns
· −sn·(n−1) , if j 6∈ S.
(3.10)
Notice that (3.7) follows immediately from (3.2) by convergence and in turn, (3.8)–(3.10) are
direct restatements of (3.4)–(3.6) of Theorem 3.3.
Theorem 3.5. Let 〈N, v〉 ∈ G and 0 < λ < 2n . Then the following holds:
(i) The limit game 〈N, v˜B〉 is B-inessential, that is 〈N,B(v˜B)〉 is inessential.
(ii) For all T ⊆ N satisfying 2 ≤ t < n
γ˜
{i}
B (T ) =
1
n− t ·
bnt
bnt−1
·
∑
j∈T
γ˜
{i}
B (T\{j}) for all i ∈ N ; particularly, (3.11)
9
γ˜
{i}
B (T ) =

bnt
bn1
· (t−1)!·(n−t)!n! , if i ∈ T ,
−bnt
bn1
· t!·(n−1−t)!n! , if i 6∈ T .
(3.12)
(iii) v˜B({i}) = Shi(N,Bv)
bn1
for all i ∈ N . (3.13)
The technical proof of Theorem 3.5 is postponed till the appendix.
PROOF of the uniqueness part of Theorem 2.4.
Parts (i) and (iii) of Theorem 3.5 are the remaining tools to complete the uniqueness part
of the axiomatic characterization listed in Theorem 2.4 with reference to a given collection
of positive scaling constants B. Suppose a value Φ on the game universal space G possesses
the B-inessential game property, continuity, and B-associated consistency with respect to the
B-associated game of (2.1). Let 〈N, v〉 ∈ G. As shown in the paragraph above Theorem 3.3,
the latter two axioms imply the value equality Φ(N, v˜B) = Φ(N, v). By Theorem 3.5(i), the
limit game 〈N, v˜B〉 is B-inessential and thus, from the B-inessential game property for Φ we
derive the following:
Φi(N, v) = Φi(N, v˜B) = bn1 · v˜B({i})
(3.13)
= Shi(N,Bv) for all i ∈ N.
Hence, Φ(N, v) = Sh(N,Bv) = ψ(N, v) for all games 〈N, v〉, where ψ is the efficient, sym-
metric, and linear value on G induced by B (see (1.5)). So, Φ = ψ. 2
4 Concluding remarks
In order to apply Theorem 2.4 to some subclasses of efficient, symmetric, and linear values,
we discuss the class of least square values, which, in turn, includes the additive efficient
normalization of any semi-value.
Example 4.1. The solidarity value Sol(N, v) of a game 〈N, v〉 is defined by some expected
average marginal contribution over all coalitions containing the player as follows [3]:
Soli(N, v) =
∑
S⊆N,
i∈S
1
n · (n−1s−1) ·
∑
j∈S
[
v(S)− v(S\{j})
s
]
for all i ∈ N .
It is known that the solidarity value is an efficient, symmetric, and linear value and in fact, its
corresponding collection of scaling constants B = {bns } is given by bns = 1s+1 for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n−1
with bnn = 1. By Theorem 2.4, the solidarity value is the unique value Φ on G verifying the
B-inessential game property, continuity, and B-associated consistency with respect to the
B-associated game 〈N, vBλ 〉 of (2.1) defined by vBλ (∅) := 0 and for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
vBλ (S)
s+ 1
=
v(S)
s+ 1
+ λ ·
∑
j∈N\S
[
v(S ∪ {j})
s+ 2
− v(S)
s+ 1
− v({j})
2
]
.
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Example 4.2. Let P = {pns | n ∈ N\{0}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n} be a (yet unspecified) collection
of probability distributions satisfying the normalization condition
n∑
s=1
(
n−1
s−1
) · pns = 1 and the
inverse Pascal triangle conditions pn−1s = pns + pns+1 for all s ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n− 1}, all n ≥ 2. For
all games 〈N, v〉 ∈ G, let the corresponding semi-value SEP(N, v) and its additive efficient
normalization ESEP(N, v) be defined as follows ([5], pages 119–120): for all i ∈ N
SEPi (N, v) =
∑
S⊆N,
i∈S
pns ·
[
v(S)− v(S\{i})
]
and
ESEPi (N, v) = SE
P
i (N, v) +
1
n
·
[
v(N)−
∑
j∈N
SEPj (N, v)
]
.
Clearly, the additive efficient normalization satisfies efficiency and inherits linearity and sym-
metry from its underlying semi-value. Consequently, the additive efficient normalization of
any semi-value is an efficient, symmetric, and linear value and in fact, its corresponding col-
lection of scaling constants B = {bns } is given by bns = s ·
(
n−1
s
) · pn−1s for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1
with bnn = 1 for all n ≥ 2. By Theorem 2.4, for any collection of positive probability distribu-
tions P, the additive efficient normalization ESEP of the underlying semi-value SEP is the
unique value Φ on G verifying the B-inessential game property, continuity, and B-associated
consistency with respect to the B-associated game 〈N, vBλ 〉 of (2.1). Clearly, the Shapley value
arises as the (unique efficient) semi-value SEP where pns =
1
n·
(
n−1
s−1
) for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n.
Example 4.3. Let 〈N, v〉 ∈ G. With every (yet unspecified) collection of nonnegative con-
stants M = {mns | n ∈ N\{0, 1}, s = 1, 2, . . . , n − 1}, there is associated the least square
value LSM(N, v) to be defined as the unique optimal solution of the following optimization
problem of which the objective function is given by the weighted sum of the square of the
“excesses” of all non-trivial coalitions (the so-called least square problem, [5], pages 113–114):
Minimize
∑
S⊆N,
S 6=N,S 6=∅
mns ·
[
v(S)−
∑
j∈S
xj
]2
subject to ~x = (xj)j∈N ∈ RN such that
∑
j∈N
xj = v(N).
Ruiz et al. ([5], Theorem 8, page 116) showed that the class of least square values is fully char-
acterized by the following five properties: efficiency, linearity, symmetry, coalitional mono-
tonicity, and inessential game property. As such, the least square family contains the additive
efficient normalization of any semi-value. Particularly, it turns out that the Shapley value
agrees with the least square value LSM whenever mns =
1
(n−1)·
(
n−2
s−1
) for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n − 1.
The solidarity value does not agree with any least square value since it violates the inessential
game property.
In fact ([5], page 114), every least square value LSM is of the form (1.3) associated with the
constants ρns =
s·(n−s)
n · m
n
s
SM(n)
or equivalently, of the form (1.4) associated with the scaling
constants bns = s ·
(
n−1
s
) · mnsSM(n) for all 1 ≤ s ≤ n− 1, where SM(n) :=∑n−1s=1 (n−2s−1) ·mns for all
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n ≥ 2.
By Theorem 2.4, for any collection of positive constants M, the corresponding least square
value LSM is the unique value Φ on G verifying the B-inessential game property, continuity,
and B-associated consistency with respect to the B-associated game 〈N, vBλ 〉 of (2.1).
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5 APPENDIX: Two additional PROOFS
PROOF of Proposition 3.2.
Let 〈N, v〉 ∈ G. The proof of (3.2) proceeds by induction on m ≥ 1. In case m = 1, then
it follows from (2.2) and the game representation (3.1) applied to the B-scaled game, that it
holds for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅,
bns · vB(S) = (B(vB))(S)
(2.2)
= (Bv)U (S)
(3.1)
=
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
γS1,U (T ) · (Bv)(T ) =
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
γS1,U (T ) · bnt · v(T ).
Thus, vB(S) =
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
bnt
bns
· γS1,U (T ) · v(T ) and hence, γS1,B(T ) = b
n
t
bns
· γS1,U (T ) for all T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅,
due to the unique representation (3.1) applied to the term vB(S). So, (3.2) holds if m = 1.
Suppose (3.2) holds for m, that is γSm,B(T ) =
bnt
bns
·γSm,U (T ) for all S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅, for all T ⊆ N ,
T 6= ∅. We aim to prove (3.2) for m+ 1.
Let S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅. We establish that γSm+1,B(T ) = b
n
t
bns
· γSm+1,U (T ) for all T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅. For
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that purpose, consider the (m+ 1)-repeated B-associated game 〈N, v(m+1)∗B〉 as follows:
(v(m+1)∗B)(S)
= (vB)m∗B(S) by definition of (m+ 1)-repeated B-associated game
(3.1)
=
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
γSm,B(T ) · vB(T ) by (3.1) applied to the B-associated game 〈N, vB〉
=
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
bnt
bns
· γSm,U (T ) · vB(T ) by the induction hypothesis
=
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
γSm,U (T )
bns
· (B(vB))(T ) by definition of the B-scaled game
(2.2)
=
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
γSm,U (T )
bns
· (Bv)U (T ) by (2.2)
(3.1)
=
1
bns
· ((Bv)U )m∗U (S) by (3.1) applied to the standard associated game 〈N, (Bv)U 〉
=
1
bns
· (Bv)(m+1)∗U (S) by definition of (m+ 1)-repeated U-associated game
(3.1)
=
1
bns
·
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
γSm+1,U (T ) · (Bv)(T ) by (3.1) applied to the game 〈N,Bv〉
=
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
γSm+1,U (T ) ·
bnt
bns
· v(T ) by definition of the B-scaled game
Hence, γSm+1,B(T ) = γ
S
m+1,U (T ) · b
n
t
bns
for all T ⊆ N , T 6= ∅, due to the unique representation
(3.1) applied to the term (v(m+1)∗B)(S). This completes the inductive proof of (3.2). The
proof of the game equality 〈N,B(vm∗B)〉 = 〈N, (Bv)m∗U 〉 has been completed before. 2
PROOF of Theorem 3.5.
(i) Let S ⊆ N , S 6= ∅. From the game representation (3.3) for the limit game 〈N, v˜B〉, together
with (3.8), we derive the following:
v˜B(S)
(3.3)
=
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
γ˜SB(T ) · v(T )
(3.8)
=
∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
[
bn1
bns
·
∑
j∈S
γ˜
{j}
B (T )
]
· v(T )
=
∑
j∈S
bn1
bns
·
[ ∑
T⊆N,
T 6=∅
γ˜
{j}
B (T ) · v(T )
]
(3.3)
=
∑
j∈S
bn1
bns
· v˜B({j}) and hence
(B(v˜B))(S) = bns · v˜B(S) =
∑
j∈S
bn1 · v˜B({j}) =
∑
j∈S
(B(v˜B))({j}).
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This proves that the B-scaled game 〈N,B(v˜B)〉 is inessential, that is the limit game 〈N, v˜B〉
itself is B-inessential.
(ii) (3.11) is equivalent to (3.9) applied to a one-person coalition. Given (3.11), the proof of
(3.12) proceeds by induction on t ≥ 1. In case t = 1, then (3.12) reduces to γ˜{i}B ({i}) = 1n ,
and γ˜{i}B ({j}) = −1n·(n−1) for all j ∈ N\{i}, which equalities hold because of (3.10). So, (3.12)
holds if t = 1. Suppose (3.12) holds for coalitions of size t − 1. We aim to prove (3.12) for
any coalition T of size t, t ≥ 2. In case i ∈ T ,
γ˜
{i}
B (T )
(3.11)
=
1
n− t ·
bnt
bnt−1
·
∑
j∈T
γ˜
{i}
B (T\{j})
=
1
n− t ·
bnt
bnt−1
· b
n
t−1
bn1
·
[
(t− 1) · (t− 2)! · (n− t+ 1)!
n!
− (t− 1)! · (n− t)!
n!
]
=
1
n− t ·
bnt
bn1
· (t− 1)! · (n− t)!
n!
· (n− t)
=
bnt
bn1
· (t− 1)! · (n− t)!
n!
Thus, (3.12) is valid in case i ∈ T , and similarly, the case i 6∈ T is left to the reader. This
completes the inductive proof of (3.12).
In fact, (3.12) yields for all i ∈ N , and all S ⊆ N\{i},
γ˜
{i}
B (S) =
−bns
bn1
· s! · (n− 1− s)!
n!
as well as γ˜{i}B (S ∪ {i}) =
bns+1
bn1
· s! · (n− 1− s)!
n!
(5.1)
From this, together with the game representation (3.3) for the limit game 〈N, v˜B〉 applied to
one-person coalitions, we derive for all i ∈ N
v˜B({i}) (3.3)=
∑
T⊆N,
T3i
γ˜
{i}
B (T ) · v(T ) +
∑
T⊆N\{i},
T 6=∅
γ˜
{i}
B (T ) · v(T )
=
∑
S⊆N\{i}
γ˜
{i}
B (S ∪ {i}) · v(S ∪ {i}) +
∑
S⊆N\{i}
γ˜
{i}
B (S) · v(S)
(5.1)
=
1
bn1
·
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s! · (n− 1− s)!
n!
·
[
bns+1 · v(S ∪ {i})− bns · v(S)
]
=
1
bn1
·
∑
S⊆N\{i}
s! · (n− 1− s)!
n!
·
[
(Bv)(S ∪ {i})− (Bv)(S)
]
(1.1)
=
1
bn1
· Shi(N,Bv)
This completes the proof of (3.13). 2
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